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The managed care industry has been criticized for sacrificing the quality of
patient care for fiscal considerations. Although managed care is responsible for
a variety of innovations and improvements to our nation's healthcare system, the
fact remains that a substantial number of managed care enrollees have been
harmed as a result of cost-cutting measures. When injuries occur, managed care
plans enjoy almost complete immunity from tort liability under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). This Note argues that the abuses of
managed care can be remedied by exposing health plans to tort liability where
their fiscal decisions result in patient injuyy. Moreover, this Note argues that by
limiting ERISA preemption to its proper, narrow scope, and by bringing ERISA
preemption into conformity with preemption jurisprudence generally, ERISA
does not bar tort claims against managed care organizations.
I. INTRODUCTION
On the morning of May 21, 1990, Basile Pappas was transported to
Haverford Community Hospital in Pennsylvania complaining of an inability to
walk and numbness of the arms, abdomen, chest, and legs.1 Pappas was
diagnosed with an epidural abscess, which was compressing his spinal cord in his
neck.2 Pappas's primary care physician and Haverford's emergency room
physician and staff neurologist agreed that Pappas was experiencing a
"neurologic emergency" that required prompt treatment.3 Unfortunately, Pappas's
condition required expertise and equipment that surpassed Haverford's
capabilities.4 Shortly after noon, Pappas's physicians made arrangements to
transfer him to a special spinal cord trauma unit at Thomas Jefferson University
Hospital.5 Before transfer, however, United States Healthcare, Inc. (USHC),
Pappas's health maintenance organization (HMO), refused to authorize Pappas's
* This Note received the Donald S. Teller Memorial Award for the student writing that
contributed most significantly to the Ohio State Law Journal.
** I would like to thank Professor Kathy S. Northern, Professor Timothy S. Jost, and
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I See Pappas v. Asbel, 675 A.2d 711, 713 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). Mr. Pappas's episode
actually began the previous day when he visited his primary care physician complaining of
neck and shoulder pain. See id. Pappas was treated with steroids and released. See id.
2 See id.
3 See id.
4 See id
5 See id
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transfer from Haverford to Jefferson on the grounds that "Jefferson was not an
approved facility" under the terms of the IHMO agreement.6 USHC continued to
refuse transfer after numerous attempts on the part of Pappas's physicians to
convince them otherwise.7 Finally, an acceptable alternative hospital was selected
although USHC's authorization procedures delayed Pappas's transfer by another
half-hour.8 By. the time USHC approved Pappas's transfer to an appropriate
facility, it was too late. Basile Pappas now suffers from permanent quadriplegia
resulting from prolonged compression of his spinal cord by the abscess.9
The tragic case of Pappas v. Asbel illustrates perhaps the most alarming flaw
in the so-called managed care revolution. The switch from traditional fee-for-
service medicine to managed care has been dramatic. For example, in 1980 it was
estimated that only five to ten percent of Americans with employer-sponsored
health insurance were enrolled in managed care plans. 10 By 1987, the percentage
had skyrocketed to sixty percent. I By 1992, over forty million Americans were
enrolled in an HMO.12 Managed care organizations 13 (MCOs) have the laudable
purpose of decreasing healthcare costs by eliminating unnecessary medical
treatments and expenditures. 14 The legal mechanisms that have traditionally
guaranteed healthcare quality and safeguarded patient's interests, however, are
oriented toward a fee-for-service type of healthcare delivery system.15 These legal
safeguards, predicated on a fee-for-service system, are ill suited to address and
counterbalance the forces that seek to reduce costs in exchange for reasonable
healthcare access and quality.16 Moreover, MCOs typically exploit preemption
6 See id.
7 See id.
8 See id,
9 See id Approximately three hours passed between diagnosis of Pappas's emergent
condition and USHC's final transfer authorization. See id.
10 See BARRY R. FURROW ErTAL., HEALTH LAW § 8-1, at 309 (1995).
11 See id.
12 See id.
13 The term "managed care organization" refers to the integration of healthcare payment,
administration, and delivery and includes a variety of managed care structures such as health
insuring corporations, health maintenance organizations, group models, independent
practitioner associations, preferred provider organizations, exclusive provider organizations,
utilization review organizations, and hospitals. See Barry R. Furrow, Managed Care
Organizations and Patient Injury: Rethinking Liability, 31 GA. L. REV. 419, 430-31 (1997);
FURROW, supra note 10, § 8-1, at 308-11 (describing the theory, practice, and structure of
managed care).
14 See Furrow, supra note 13, at 427-42 (discussing the theory of managed care).
15 See Edward B. Hirshfeld & Gail H. Thomason, Medical Necessity Determinations: The
Need for a New Legal Structure, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 3, 9-10 (1996) (describing the foundation
of medical malpractice rooted in an implied contract between an individual patient and an
individual physician).
16 See Clark C. Havighurst, Making Health Plans Accountable for the Quality of Care, 31
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under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)17 to avoid
liability for adverse patient outcomes by artificially divorcing health plan
management from the delivery and quality of healthcare services.
The hallmark of the managed care revolution is the integration of healthcare
management, finance, and delivery. Under the old fee-for-service model, payment
for healthcare services was administered by an insurance scheme that was
completely independent from the physician's practice. Integration combines the
delivery and management of healthcare services under one banner. Thus,
management, finance, and delivery of healthcare services are all constituent parts
of the larger whole of the modem MCO. Within this integrated enterprise, the
fiscal and management arms of the MCO necessarily make de facto treatment
decisions that restrict the discretion of healthcare professionals and directly
impact patient outcomes. Yet, MCOs are able to take refuge in the fiction that
health plan management is a separate and distinct function from healthcare
delivery. As a result, MCOs have exploited a framework that allows them to
simultaneously enjoy the benefits of both a unitary and a divided organizational
form.
On the unitary side, MCOs are able to direct the work of physicians and exert
a coercive influence over their clinical judgments in order to decrease utilization
and cut costs. However, in the face of adverse patient outcomes, MCOs shed their
unitary guise and adopt a compartmentalized form in order to isolate medical
malpractice liability at the physician level. Such a system disconnects the
considerable cost-cutting power wielded by MCOs from meaningful
accountability for the consequences. Moreover, many courts view the current
state of medical malpractice law to require physicians to answer for adverse
patient outcomes flowing from cost-containment decisions. Because MCOs can
separate cost-containment actions from legal accountability, they are able to
sacrifice healthcare quality, for the sake of financial savings, with relative
impunity. The imposition of direct medical malpractice liability against MCOs
can bring a fair and equitable allocation of accountability to the nation's
healthcare system and put an end to the fiction that MCOs merely manage
healthcare and do not play a role in patient outcomes.
This Note will argue that the application of direct tort liability against MCOs
for medical malpractice is appropriate because MCOs should be responsible and
accountable when their cost containment policies cause physicians to deliver sub-
standard healthcare. Part I will describe the various strategies employed by
MCOs to reduce costs and utilization of healthcare resources. In particular, this
Part will explain prospective utilization review and its implications for healthcare
quality, patient outcomes, and, most importantly, MCO liability. Part III will
describe and critique the shortcomings of the various theories of liability currently
GA. L. REV. 587, 610-11 (1997) (discussing how MCOs do a poor job of equitably refocusing
liability such that they avoid responsibility for the quality of care delivered under their control).
17 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
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available to plaintiffs in actions against MCOs. Part IV will analyze the confusion
surrounding the scope of ERISA preemption. In light of the United States
Supreme Court's decisions in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.18 and New York
State Conference ofBlue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.,19
it appears that the Court generally is receptive to the idea of a diminished scope of
federal preemption. Despite the abuses of ERISA preemption within the managed
care industry, the shrinking scope of preemption has not been extended into the
ERISA context. Without generalizing this narrower construction of preemption to
ERISA, state attempts to remedy defects in managed care will fail. Therefore, the
managed care revolution requires a modification of the prevailing doctrine of
federal preemption of state tort liability for MCOs. Part V will explain how direct
MCO tort liability for negligent utilization review decisions should be
implemented. Specifically, the elements of the cause of action, the establishment
of the standard of care, and the role of utilization review expert witnesses in
proving the cause of action will be outlined.
II. MANAGED CARE COST CONTANMENT AND THE DANGERS OF
UTILZATION REVIEW
A. Cost Containment and Reduced Utilization ofHealthcare Services
MCOs employ a variety of administrative and fiscal mechanisms in order to
reduce healthcare costs and discourage unnecessary care and treatment.20 One
management strategy is to pay physicians on a capitation basis 21 Two main
features of capitation schemes are fiat-rate payments to providers on a per patient
basis and flat-rate payments based on diagnosis.22 Another cost-containment
18 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (finding that federal smoking legislation does not preempt certain
state law claims).
19 514 U.S. 645 (1995) (declining to broadly interpret the ERISA preemption provision).
20 See generally Hirshfeld & Thomason, supra note 15, at 26-29 (discussing both direct
and indirect influences over medical decisionmaking including utilization review, case
management, practice guidelines, physician profiling, financial incentives, financial withholds,
and capitation).
21 See Patricia A. Danzon, Tort Liability: A Minefield for Managed Care?, 26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 491, 498 (1997) (stating that capitation works "to shift from passive payment of
providers, based on fee-for-service or costs incurred, to various forms of fixed fee payment for a
comprehensive episode or period of care, regardless of the volume or cost of services actually
delivered"); James F. Henry, Comment, Liability of Managed Care Organizations After Dukes
v. U.S. Healthcare an ElementalAnalysis, 27 CuMB. L REv. 681, 703 (1996-1997) (describing
the re-allocation of the risk of high costs from the insurer to the physician under capitation
systems).
22 See Larry J. Pittman, ERISA's Preemption Clause and the Health Care Industry: An
Abdication of Judicial Law-Creating Authority, 46 FLA. L. REV. 355, 362 (1994) ("One of the
first prospective payment systems was established when the federal government created the
1426 [Vol. 59:1423
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strategy involves preferred provider arrangements between MCOs and individual
healthcare professionals in which healthcare providers receive the right to treat the
MCO's subscribers in exchange for participation in the managed care system.
2 3
Additionally, MCOs typically require prior authorization before approving
reimbursement.24 This prior authorization, known as utilization review, may
include practice guidelines, treatment protocols, and pre-approved treatment
plans.25
Utilization review is one of the most widely used and, potentially, one of the
most troubling cost-containment mechanisms employed by MCOs. 6 Utilization
review may result in the delivery of healthcare that exceeds, equals, or falls below
the accepted standard of care. Ideally, MCOs seek to achieve utilization review
that approximates the standard of care. When utilization review causes care to
surpass the prevailing standard, waste, inefficiency, and over-utilization result. On
the other hand, when utilization review causes healthcare delivery to fall below
the accepted standard of care, adverse patient outcomes are likely to occur.
Utilization review has been a fixture of healthcare management for decades.
Under the traditional fee-for-service system, utilization review was done
retrospectively 2 7 With retrospective utilization review, healthcare services were
delivered to the patient before cost, reimbursement and medical necessity were
considered. The insurer would review the physician's actions after the fact and
either grant or deny reimbursement. Denial of reimbursement meant that the
insurer, and not the physician or patient, absorbed the cost of the uncovered
service.28 For this reason, retrospective utilization review was not entirely
effective at controlling healthcare costs and reducing unnecessary treatment. Once
the physician prescribed and delivered a service or performed a procedure, the act
was done. Retrospective utilization review could not undo the past. Thus,
diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) for reimbursement of medical expenses to medicare patients
in 1983.").
23 See Danzon, supra note 21, at 498 ("Managed care plans typically restrict coverage to a
network of 'preferred providers,' who agree to accept lower fees and/or assume financial risk in
return for the higher volume that results from participation in the network.").
24 See id.
25 See id Practice guidelines, treatment protocols, and pre-approved treatment plans are
cost-containment tools in which MCOs prescribe the treatments, tests, medications, and other
facets of treatment authorized under the plan.
26 See Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 811-12 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (discussing
potential negative implications that erroneous utilization review decisions can have on patient
outcomes).
27 See John D. Blum, An Analysis of Legal Liability in Health Care Utilization Review
and Case Management, 26 Hous. L. REV. 191, 192-93 (1989); Barry R. Furrow, Medical
Malpractice and Cost Containment: Tightening the Screws, 36 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 985,
986-87 (1986).
28 See Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1326-27 (5th Cir. 1992)
(discussing the general principles and operation of prospective utilization review systems).
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retrospective utilization review, while preserving physician autonomy and
emphasizing patient preferences, was subject to abuse by providers who
prescribed treatments that would later prove to be unnecessary, wasteful, and
inefficient.
As knowledge and understanding of geographical variations in treatment and
medical necessity grew, insurance companies and MCOs began to implement
strategies to prevent unnecessary care and expenses.29 Thus, the use of concurrent
and prospective utilization review by MCOs became widely accepted. Concurrent
utilization review requires contemporaneous monitoring of non-emergency
treatment decisions to determine their appropriateness and necessity.3 ° In
managed care systems that employ prospective utilization review, healthcare
providers must secure advance authorization before rendering medical
treatment.31 As the Pappas32 case graphically illustrates, prospective utilization
review can have tragic consequences when the reviewer makes an incorrect or
delayed assessment of the necessity of a given treatment or procedure. The entire
prospective utilization review process is rife with dangers. First, the individual
performing the utilization review is typically not on the scene and must
communicate with the treating physicians by telephone. Such physical distance
makes it nearly impossible for the utilization reviewer to make a truly informed
decision regarding the necessity of the patient's treatment. 33 Second, most
utilization reviewers are not physicians and many lack any training or education
in the health sciences at all.34 Yet, attending physicians must yield in judgment to
utilization review decisions made by these non-physicians. Thus, prospective
utilization review has evolved into an absurd system in which distant unqualified,
and ill-informed reviewers are empowered to veto the sound clinical decisions of
treating physicians. Such a system invites human tragedy resulting from
erroneous utilization review determinations.
B. The Link Between Utilization Review Decisions and Clinical Decisions
The link between utilization review decisions and clinical treatment decisions
is so strong that the line separating administrative functions from treatment
2 9 See Hirshfeld & Thomason, supra note 15, at 18-23 (discussing the evolution of the
concept of medical necessity).
3 0 See generally Blum, supra note 27, at 192-93 (explaining utilization review); Linda V.
Tiano, The Legal Implications of HMO Cost Containment Measures, 14 SsrON HALL LEGIS. J.
79, 80 (1990) (same).
31 See Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
3 2 Pappas v. Asbel, 675 A.2d 711 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
33 See Physicians Form Group to Counter Managed Care Policies, Associated Press, Nov. 29,
1994, available in 1994 WL 10109993 ('The plans leave decisions on the best treatment to insurance
company clerks sitting at computer terminals hundreds of miles away... ).
3 4 See id
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functions within managed care entities is virtually non-existent 3 5 The blurring of
the distinction between treatment decisions and treatment delivery has important
consequences. Cost-containment strategies create a "professional conflict"
between healthcare professionals and MCOs. 3 6 Physicians and other healthcare
professionals have legal, ethical, and fiduciary obligations to place the health and
well-being of their patients ahead of all other considerations. 37 Yet, MCOs exist
primarily to reduce costs and ensure a minimum level of care for their
subscribers. This dichotomy in purpose, between healthcare professionals and
MCOs, results in tension. As Pappas demonstrates, a physician's concern for her
patient often collides head-on with a MCO's concern for cost containment. Due to
the disparity in power between MCOs and physicians, the concerns and priorities
of the MCOs typically prevail. MCOs derive their power over physicians by
controlling the physician's access to patients. As more Americans become
enrolled in managed care plans, physicians have increasingly been forced to
affiliate their practices with MCOs in order to retain patients and keep their
practices solvent.38 Because MCOs effectively control the supply of
customers/patients, physicians, are at the mercy of MCOs. Thus, the MCO holds
the power to take away the physician's customers/patients in the event that the
physicians do not adhere to MCO policies and procedures such as utilization
review directives. 39
3 5 See Hirshfeld & Thomason, supra note 15, at 4. Hirshfeld and Thomason state that:
There is an area where coverage decisions and medical decisions merge. When a health
plan agrees to cover health care services, the contract with the beneficiary generally
specifies that the services must be paid for when they are reasonable and necessary for the
diagnosis or treatment of an illness or injury suffered by the beneficiary. In the event of a
dispute between the health plan and the beneficiary about whether covered services should
be paid for, a determination about Whether the services were reasonable and necessary
must be made. This determination, while a coverage decision, is also a medical decision.
... [Tjhe medical decision made as a part of a coverage decision is not independent
from the medical decisions made by the physician and patient ..... The coverage decision
becomes the treatment decision ....
Id.
36 See Henry, supra note 21, at 716-17 (discussing the conflict between physicians'
obligation to provide high quality care and to place the patient's well-being before all other
considerations and the MCO's obligation to reduce healthcare costs).
37 See id; see also HIPPoCRATIC OATH, reprinted in TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL
DICIONARY 902 (Clayton L. Thomas ed., FA. Davis Co. 17th ed. 1993).
38 See Hirshfeld & Thomason, supra note 15, at 39 (discussing how the economic
pressures exerted by MCOs alter physicians' practices as a result of the paucity of available
patients).
39 See All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, Apr. 14, 1997)
(interviewing Dr. Tom Giltanen) available in 1997 WL 12832820; 60 Minutes: HMO; the Pros
and Cons of Having an HMO Take Care of Your Medical Needs (CBS television broadcast,
1998] 1429
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C. The Bifurcation ofResponsibility for Patient Care
Another consequence of the melding of management and treatment decisions
is the bifurcation of responsibility for patient care.4° Bifurcation refers to the split
in accountability such that responsibility for healthcare financing and cost rests
with one group (the MCO), while legal responsibility for healthcare services and
quality rests with another group (healthcare professionals).41 This bifurcation of
accountability and responsibility is possible because medical malpractice law is
arranged toward a traditional fee-for-service healthcare system and has not kept
pace with the transition to managed care.42 Such a legal perspective ignores the
reality that MCOs are engaged in the virtual practice of medicine by controlling
the physician's practice and restricting treatment options through utilization
review.43 Thus, bifurcation results in an inequitable and disparate allocation of
accountability. MCOs are able to exercise a high degree of control over
healthcare delivery with relatively little accompanying accountability or exposure
to liability. Conversely, physicians enjoy a small measure of control and
autonomy while bearing the lion's share of the responsibility for poor patient
outcomes. 44
D. The Benefits and Shortcomings ofManaged Care
The above discussion is not to suggest that managed care's impact on the
Oct. 1, 1995) (interviewing Dr. Robert Plancey and Dr. Rex Green) available in 1995 WL
2729812.
4 0 See Havighurst, supra note 16, at 587.
41 See id.
4 2 See id. at 611-12.
43 See id at 618 ("[Ain MCO has too many ways to influence the clinical decisions of
medical specialists to permit it to deny that it is in the business of practicing medicine or
otherwise to escape liability for breakdowns of the system over which it presides!"). But see
Barbara A. Noah, The Managed Care Dilemma: Can Theories of Tort Liability Adapt to the
Realities of Cost Containment?, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1219, 1231-32 (1997) (arguing that
physicians can practice high quality medicine in managed care systems without breaching the
malpractice standard of care).
4 4 See Havighurst, supra note 16, at 611-13. Havighurst explains that:
MCOs have been able to avoid legal accountability for the medical services they arrange
for, manage, and finance only because the law on this subject embodies a paradigm of
medical care that has not been updated to embrace the concept of corporately managed
services .... It is simply ironic that a legal system which has finally seen fit to empower
MCOs to control the cost of health care remains fastidious about making them also
responsible for its quality. Both legislatures and courts seem to be in de jure denial of the
de facto reality of corporate medical care.
1430 [Vol. 59:1423
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nation's healthcare system has been entirely negative. Managed care has been
somewhat successful in streamlining health service utilization through such
innovations as reductions in hospital admissions, increased use of less costly
primary care physicians and nurse practitioners, and moving certain treatments
and procedures from in-patient to out-patient settings.45 MCOs have also been
credited with improving the health status of their subscribers through preventive
care and the careful monitoring and selection of participating physicians.46
Further, some studies suggest that the overall quality of the American healthcare
system has not suffered as a result of the transition to managed care.47 Despite the
positive inroads that managed care has made in reducing costs without an
aggregate decline in healthcare quality or an increase in poor patient outcomes,
doubts regarding managed care's commitment to quality continue to persist.4 8 A
substantial body of anecdotal evidence suggests that a significant number of
patients are harmed as a result of MCO cost-containment policies.49 Pappas
illustrates this point. Clearly, MCOs bear the brunt of the blame for instances of
poor quality healthcare in the eyes of both the public and the medical
community.50 Physicians feel constrained in their ability to act in the best interest
of their patients as a result of practice restrictions imposed by their MCOs.
Patients perceive a managed care system, as reported in the popular media, that
places profit and cost containment over their well-being and ability to obtain
appropriate care.51 Consequently, litigants should increasingly look to hold
4 5 See Hirshfeld & Thomason, supra note 15, at 35.
4 6 See Havighurst, supra note 16, at 593-94 (discussing the positive contributions that
managed care has made to the general quality of healthcare).
4 7 See Hirshfeld & Thomason, supra note 15, at 35-36; see also HARVARD MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK 6 (1990) (estimating that eight times
as many patients suffered an injury from medical negligence as filed malpractice claims in the
state of New York before the widespread implementation of managed care).
4 8 See Noah, supra note 43, at 1230 ("Patients who experience bad outcomes under plans
that employ cost-control strategies ... often attribute these bad outcomes to the MCO's
emphasis on cost containment, and they argue that the plan's structure provides disincentives
for quality care."). See generally GEORGE ANDERS, HEALTH AGAINST WEALTH: HMOS AND
THE BREAKDOWN OF MEDICAL TRUST (1996) (describing the effects of managed care on
individuals and the health care industry); Havighurst, supra note 16, at 590-92 (discussing the
current backlash against managed care); Hirshfeld & Thomason, supra note 15, at 36
(discussing anecdotes of patient harm resulting from health plans that refused medical care).
49 See Hirshfeld & Thomason, supra note 15, at 36-37 (suggesting that individual
instances of adverse outcomes are not reflected in empirical research because either the adverse
outcomes reported in the media did not result in permanent harm or the patient obtained
appropriate medical care outside the MCO after being denied coverage).
50 See David R. Olmos, Survey Finds Wide Distrust of HMO Care, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6,
1997, at Al (reporting on the generally negative public opinion of managed care according to
researchers at Harvard University and the Kaiser Family Foundation).
51 See Laura Meckler, Clinton Appoints Commission to Protect Patients, Associated
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MCOs liable for poor patient outcomes when the treating physician practices
under the restrictions of cost containment. This liability is predicated on the idea
that "corporate middlemen," who effectively direct treatment via utilization
review decisions, should not be permitted to avoid legal responsibility for care
provided by physicians laboring under the constraints of utilization restrictions.52
By erasing the artificial distinction between management of care and delivery of
care and recognizing that, for the purposes of tort liability, MCOs stand on equal
footing with physicians, MCOs can and should be exposed to liability when their
utilization review determinations cause harm to plan enrollees.
I. DEFICIENCIES IN MANAGED CARE LIABILITY AND THE NEED FOR
DIRECT LIABILrTY FOR NEGLIGENT UTILIZATION REVIEW DECISIONS BY
MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATIONS
A. The Current State ofLiability for Managed Care Organizations
Clearly, MCO cost-containment and utilization review procedures can play a
significant role in the chain of causation resulting in patient injury. Moreover,
MCOs can set the stage for medical malpractice, on the part of healthcare
professionals, by undermining physician autonomy through restrictions on
available treatment options. Currently, there are several tort theories available to
plaintiffs injured in managed care settings. Some of these theories allow plaintiffs
to seek recovery directly against the responsible healthcare professional. Other
theories allow plaintiffs to reach hospitals and, to a lesser extent, MCOs by
channeling liability through physicians. Still other theories attempt to bypass
vicarious liability and proceed directly against MCOs for adverse patient
outcomes. Although most of the following theories of recovery have only been
used against MCOs to a limited extent, they have a proven track record against
physicians and hospitals. Just as liability evolved to extend from individual
physicians to hospitals, it increasingly extends to include MCOs. Consequently,
many of the tort theories that are applicable to physicians and hospitals are
potentially of equal applicability to MCOs.5 3
Press, Mar. 26, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4859270 (Calling for a patient's bill of rights,
President Clinton noted that "many Americans worry that lower costs mean lower quality and
less attention to their rights.").
52 See Havighurt, supranote 16, at 614.
53 See generally Barry R. Furrow, Enterprise Liability and Health Care Reform:
Managing Care and Managing Risk, 39 ST. LouIs U. LJ. 79, 82-94 (1994) (discussing the
evolution of malpractice liability from physicians to hospitals, and finally, to integrated delivery
systems).
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1. History ofMedical Malpractice Liability
In the early days of medical negligence law, only physicians were liable in
tort for malpractice. Hospitals were exempt from liability under the doctrine of
charitable immunity.54 Most hospitals were operated by religious and secular
charitable organizations until the first half of the twentieth century. Courts
extended charitable immunity to hospitals to protect their financial well-being, to
encourage donations, and to ease the procurement of insurance.55 In the 1940s,
charitable immunity disappeared as hospitals began to evolve from strictly
charitable institutions to more business-oriented institutions. 56 Courts also began
to recognize that hospitals were in the best position to avoid the harm and loss of
medical negligence.57 The demise of charitable immunity had two important
consequences. First, hospitals became subject to liability for the torts of their
employees. Second, physicians and hospitals were positioned to share legal
responsibility for malpractice.
Plaintiffs in medical malpractice suits could, theoretically, proceed against a
hospital under the doctrine of respondeat superior58 when the physician was
directly employed by the hospital. However, the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine effectively prevented physicians from entering into employee-employer
relationships with hospitals.5 9 The corporate practice of medicine doctrine is
rooted in licensure laws and holds that only individuals, and not corporations,
may practice medicine. Because a corporation, such as a hospital, could not
54 See Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the
Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381,385 (1994).
55 See FURROW ErAL., supra note 10, § 7-1(a), at 290-91.
56 See President & Dirs. of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942)
(declining to extend charitable immunity to a charitable teaching hospital); Bing v. Thunig, 143
N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957) (abandoning charitable immunity and imposing general liability
principles on hospitals).
5 7 See President & Dirs. of Georgetown College, 130 F.2d. at 811.
5 8 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 69-71
(5th ed. 1984); see also Joanne B. Stem, Malpractice in the Managed Care Industry, 24
CREIGHToN L. REv. 1285, 1286-88 (1991) (discussing vicarious liability theories in the
medical malpractice context).
5 9 See David D. Griner, Note, Paying the Piper: Third-Party Payor Liability for Medical
Treatment Decisions, 25 GA. L. REv. 861, 891-92 (1991). Griner explains that:
Although hospitals were liable for the negligence of their employees and agents under the
doctrine of respondeat superior, because a hospital could not be licensed to practice
medicine, it could not properly supervise the medical staff in the performance of medical
acts. Physicians were considered to be independent contractors because the hospital
exerted no control over their activities.
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practice medicine, a corporation could not be held liable for professional
negligence.60
2. Expanding Liability Through the Application ofAgency Principles
In response to the limits on liability imposed by the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine, courts began to focus on the control that hospitals exercised
over physicians, independent of the lack of an employee-employer relationship, to
apply agency principles to allow liability to run to hospitals for the torts
committed by physicians. 61 The related principles of vicarious liability, agency by
estoppel,62 apparent agency, and ostensible agency63 have evolved into viable
theories of recovery against hospitals for medical malpractice.64 The essence of
these liability theories is the patient's perception of a principal-agent relationship
between the physician and the hospital and the degree of control that the hospital
holds over the physician and the treatment setting.65 Cases against hospitals and
MCOs brought under these agency theories often arise in emergency treatment
contexts and focus on whether the patient reasonably and justifiably looked to the
institution, as opposed to the individual practitioner, for treatment and whether the
60 See id.
61 See Havighurst, supra note 16, at 596-601 (describing the evolution of the judicial
application of agency-based liability to hospitals); see also Noah, supra note 43, at 1240-42
(discussing the theory of ostensible agency).
62 The Restatement (Second) ofAgency defines "agency by estoppel" as:
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent and thereby causes a third
person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of such apparent agent is subject to liability
to the third person for harm caused by the lack of care or skill of the one appearing to be a
servant or other agent as if he were such.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958).
63 The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines "ostensible agency" as:
One who employs an independent contractor to perform services for another which are
accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are being rendered by the employer or by
his servants, is subject to liability for physical harm caused by the negligence of the
contractor in supplying such services, to the same extent as though the employer were
supplying them himself or by his servants.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965).
64 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 54, at 387-88 (discussing situations in which courts
have found emergency room physicians in independent contractor relationships with hospitals
to be ostensible agents of the hospital).
65 See Furrow, supra note 13, at 451-53 (discussing the under-pinnings of vicarious
liability and agency law and the control and ostensible agency tests used to determine the nature
of the physician-hospital relationship).
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institution "holds out" the physician as an employee.66 Although hospitals can
take steps to obviate the appearance of a principal-agent relationship to avoid
liability via agency theories,67 these theories tend to be well-received by the
courts and provide plaintiffs with an actionable theory of recovery.68
3. Corporate Negligence
Plaintiffs have sought to hold hospitals and MCOs accountable for poor
quality care under corporate negligence theories. At the heart of the corporate
negligence doctrine is the hospital and MCO's duty to the public to evaluate
physicians, grant staff privileges, and control and supervise staff physicians in a
non-negligent manner.69 Failure to exercise reasonable care in the performance of
these and other corporate functions may give rise to a cause of action under
corporate negligence. Corporate negligence also contemplates a healthcare
institution's duty to provide adequate equipment and operating procedures to
ensure patient safety.70
Several cases illustrate the theory of corporate negligence. In Darling v.
Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, for example, a college football player
was treated for a broken leg by the defendant-hospital. 71 The plaintiff's leg was
amputated as a result of the misapplication of a plaster cast and the failure of the
hospital's doctors and nurses to recognize and treat a progressive gangrenous
condition.72 The Darling court found a duty on the part of the hospital to review
the attending physician's work and to require consultations among physicians and
nurses.73 More recently, the California Court of Appeals endorsed a corporate
6 6 See Noah, supra note 43, at 1240-42 (discussing ostensible agency theories).
67 For example, the Ohio Revised Code provides that the lack of "notice or knowledge"
necessary for the assertion of an "ostensible agency" or "agency by estoppel" claim may be
precluded by the following notice: "[p]hysicians who render professional services to you in
(name of hospital) are independent practitioners and are not employees or agents of the hospital.
(name of hospital) is not responsible for the acts or omissions of physicians that are not directed
or controlled by (name of hospital)." OHIO REVISED CODE § 2307A8(B)(1) (Anderson Supp.
1997).
68 See Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)
(describing factors indicative of an ostensible agency relationship between a physician and a
hospital).
69 See Stem, supra note 58, at 1289-91 (discussing corporate negligence doctrine); see
also Furrow, supra note 13, at 457 (discussing duties that arise under the theory of corporate
negligence).
70 See Furrow, supra note 13, at 459-60 (describing negligence flowing to the health care
institution from management and control of corporate policies and personnel).
71 See 211 N.E.2d 253 (Il. 1965).
72 See id at 255-56.
73 See id at 258; see also Griner, supra note 59, at 895-97 (discussing corporate
negligence and the Darling decision); Havighurst, supra note 16, at 601-03 (discussing
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negligence theory against an insurance company in Wilson v. Blue Cross of
Southern California.74 In Wilson, plaintiff's decedent, suffering from clinical
depression, drug dependency, and anorexia, committed suicide after his insurance
company refused to cover in-patient care against the advice of the treating
physician.75 The Wilson court allowed the issue of "whether the conduct of the
decedent's insurance company... was a substantial factor in causing the
decedent's death" to go to the jury.76 In so holding, the court limited an earlier
holding and bolstered the viability of corporate negligence as an avenue of
recovery against hospitals and MCOs for injuries resulting from negligent
treatment. 77
4. Other Theories ofLiability
In addition to the theories discussed above, there are a number of other causes
of action available to plaintiffs injured either directly or indirectly by MCO cost-
containment policies. One alternative is tortious interference with the physician-
patient relationship. A cause of action may arise under this theory when "the
managed care system compromises the providers' relationship with an enrollee
[such that] the system itself has at least negligently and perhaps recklessly
interfered with the basic fiduciary relationship between the patient and the
doctor."78 In Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., the court found that
such a claim might be actionable when a physician refuses to treat a patient as a
result of intimidation on the part of the patient's insurer.7 9 Other theories of
recovery against MCOs include, inter alia, negligent misrepresentation, insurance
bad faith, infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, defamation, and
claims brought under anti-trust law.80
corporate negligence and the Darling decision).
74 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
7 5 See id. at 877-78.
7 6 Id. at 878.
77 In Wickline v. State, the California Court of Appeals declined to extend liability for
malpractice to a state-operated MCO on the grounds that physicians are solely responsible for
treatment outcomes and that MCOs do not participate in treatment decisions. See 239 Cal. Rptr.
810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). However, the court entertained the idea that "[t]hird party payors of
health care services can be held legally accountable when medically inappropriate decisions
result from defects in the design or implementation of cost containment mechanisms as, for
example, when appeals on a patient's behalf.., are arbitrarily ignored or unreasonably
disregarded or overridden." Id. at 819; see also Danzon, supra note 21, at 507 (discussing the
implications of the Wicldine decision).
78 Stem, supra note 58, at 1295.
79 See 237 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
80 See Stem, supra note 58, at 1295-97 (describing causes of action against MCOs arising
under tortious interference with the physician-patient relationship and negligent
misrepresentation); Tiano, supra note 30, at 89-100 (describing causes of action against MCOs
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B. Inadequacies of the Current State ofManaged Care Liability
1. Vicarious Liability and Agency-Based Liability
As the above discussion demonstrates, plaintiffs have an array of options at
their disposal to hold MCOs liable for their role in adverse healthcare outcomes.
However, these theories of liability are inadequate because they fail to address
and recognize the direct role that MCOs play in the healthcare system. Under
agency theories of liability, plaintiffs may only reach MCOs by first going after
the physician. If a plaintiff can recover sufficient damages from the physician, it is
unlikely that the plaintiff will take the extra step of pressing a claim against the
MCO. Therefore, MCOs can use physicians as a shield against vicarious
liability.81 Vicarious liability also fails to exert a deterrent effect upon negligent
utilization review decisions. Indirect liability allows utilization review to escape
scrutiny by concentrating on the acts of the physicians and ignoring the
organizational cost-containment policies. Thus, the current law enables MCOs to
continue to practice utilization review in the shadows and away from the light of
accountability and potential liability. Additionally, vicarious liability theories
provide insufficient avenues of recovery when the physician acts properly and the
source of the injury originates at the management level of the MCO. In these
cases, the plaintiff is forced to seek recovery against a non-negligent physician
and is effectively prevented from reaching the culpable managed care entity.
In summary, vicarious liability and agency theories inadequately serve the
interests of contemporary managed care systems for several reasons. First,
physicians and other healthcare providers, like the treating physicians in
Pappas,82 are in a frustrating and untenable position. These physicians unfairly
find themselves named as defendants in instances where they provided the best
possible care in light of the restrictions imposed by the MCO. Second, because
vicarious - liability theories require negligence on the part of the individual
healthcare professional, these theories are not viable options when the MCO is
responsible for the majority of the injury or the case against the individual
practitioner is weak. Finally, indirect liability unjustly shifts the liability for poor
patient outcomes to physicians and maintains the legal fiction that MCOs bear
only indirect, if any, responsibility when their cost-containment policies result in
arising under breach of contract, insurance bad faith, infliction of emotional distress,
defamation, interference with contract, and anti-trust).
81 In Wickline v. State, for example, a California Court of Appeals held that physicians,
and not managed care entities, are ultimately responsible for medically inappropriate decisions
resulting from cost containment mechanisms. In imposing a duty on the part of physicians to
ignore medically inappropriate utilization review decisions, the court effectively placed the
physician in a position to shield MCOs against liability. See Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr.
810, 819-20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
82 Pappas v. Asbel, 675 A.2d 711 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
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harm to patients. In case after case, MCOs clearly play a direct and profound role
in adverse patient outcomes when cost-containment policies and decisions cause
physicians to fall below the standard of care. Yet, vicarious liability and agency-
based liability have proved ineffective at deterring such conduct and remediating
the resulting harm. 83
2. Direct Tort Liability and Contract Remedies
Currently available theories of direct MCO liability are also insufficient for
plaintiffs whose injuries stem from breakdowns in managed care. Utilization
review procedures are not negligentper se. Therefore, direct corporate negligence
is not amenable to situations involving a failure of an otherwise non-negligent
review system. In most cases, utilization review decisions result in care that meets
the minimum standard of care. When, as in Pappas, an erroneous utilization
review decision results in injury, recovery is more logically predicated upon
malpractice than upon corporate negligence. In these cases, the issue is not the
implementation of a defective system that would give rise to a corporate
negligence claim.84 Rather, the issue is analogous to a classic case of medical
malpractice in which a negligent utilization review determination causes injury.
The fact that the negligence is committed by an MCO, and not a physician,
merely acknowledges the reality that MCOs are engaged in the practice of
medicine.
While patients may also pursue contract remedies directly against MCOs,
these remedies are limited to enforcement of the terms of the contract or to money
or coverage due under the contract.85 In a case like Pappas, for example, a
plaintiffs recovery is limited to the amount of coverage and services wrongfully
denied. Such recovery is grossly inadequate to compensate individuals who suffer
grievous, debilitating, life-long injuries.
C. The Case for Direct Negligent Utilization Review Liability for MCOs
It has been suggested that the tort system does a poor job of resolving
managed care quality issues.86 Alternate regulatory and compensatory schemes
based upon other bodies of law have been proposed as an alternative to tort
liability. One commentator, for example, has denounced the extension of tort
liability to MCOs on the grounds that to do so would cause increasing
83 See Havighurst, supra note 16, at 596-611 (describing the ineffectiveness of agency
liability in improving quality of care in both the hospital and managed care contexts).84 See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text (discussing corporate negligence).
85 Under the civil enforcement provision of ERISA, for example, recovery is limited to
"benefits due to [the enrollee] under the terms of [the enrollee's] plan." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994).
86 See Danzon, supra note 21, at 507-08.
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interference with physician autonomy. 87 However, such a proposal ignores the
fact that physician autonomy is already significantly diminished under managed
care. Other proposals include the establishment of a "cost constraints" defense to
liability and the immunization of MCOs in malpractice cases.88 The recognition
of a cost constraints defense would essentially give MCOs license to implement
utilization review standards that brazenly place profit over patient safety.
Furthermore, such a defense would remove any market incentives to internalize
the potential costs of adverse outcomes and provide reasonable access to
appropriate healthcare. Immunizing MCOs from tort liability is antithetical to
notions of fairness, justice, and accountability and ignores the fact that MCOs
play a direct and substantial role in treatment decisions.89 Contractual remedies
have also been proposed as a solution to bring patientlenrollee expectations into
conformity with the care available through their MCOs.90 These contract
remedies focus on the intent of the patient at the time of enrollment in the
managed care plan.91 The intent of the enrollee is based upon the predicted risk
and probability of future disease and injury.92 However, contract-based remedies
ignore the fact that managed care enrollees are seldom familiar with the terms of
their coverage and give little thought to unforeseeable catastrophic illness or
injury. Therefore, contract-based strategies for resolving managed care quality
issues are illusory.
Non-tort-based solutions for improving the quality of managed care plans
ignore the powerful role that tort law can play in affecting pro-social changes in
the healthcare industry.93 In Helling v. Carey, for example, the Supreme Court of
Washington, in a medical malpractice action against an ophthalmologist,
redefined and improved the standard of care regarding glaucoma testing for
persons under the age of forty.94 This pro-patient change in the standard of care,
87 See Noah, supra note 43, at 1250.
8 8 See id at 1250-51 ("Permitting MCOs to assert cost constraints as a defense to liability
or granting total immunity from suit to these organizations under certain circumstances may
represent the most sensible solution to the pressing problems of access and quality.").
89 See Havighurst, supra note 16, at 627 (proposing legislation that would not "permit
MCOs to hide behind the fiction that MCO-selected physicians work for patients, not for a
corporate health plan"). But see Noah, supra note 43, at 1250 ("Extending tort liability to
[MCOs] may have the perverse effect of increasing their interference with physician
autonomy.").
90 See Clark C. Havighurst, Altering the Applicable Standard of Care, 49 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 265, 272-75 (1986) (suggesting a contractual strategy to define the liability
of MCOs).
91 See Danzon, supra note 21, at 508-09.
92 See id
93 See Hirshfeld & Thomason, supra note 15, at 10 (discussing the power of the courts to
make value judgments regarding the necessity of medical care).
94 See Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974) (en banc).
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as it related to glaucoma testing, resulted from fear of exposure to tort liability
because it became less expensive to screen every patient for glaucoma than to pay
large tort judgments for failure to diagnose. Direct MCO liability has the potential
to facilitate similar improvements to patient access and quality of care in the
managed care system. Under a direct liability scheme, MCOs would be forced to
consider the costs of a potential lawsuit that would result from an erroneous cost-
containment decision. The economic pressure of such a consideration would shift
the analytical balance to favor quality of care and positive patient outcomes and
disfavor parsimonious and unreasonable cost-containment policies. It would
simply be cheaper for MCOs to provide higher quality healthcare and relieve
physicians of burdensome practice restrictions than to pay tort judgments flowing
from less expensive and lower quality care. Direct liability would effectively beat
the managed care industry at its own game by underscoring the impact of quality
of care issues in the cost-savings equation.
While the law continues to view the healthcare industry in an antiquated fee-
for-service fashion, the reality of managed care has emerged to shift the balance
of power from physicians to MCOs while leaving courts and legislatures stuck in
the past.95 Without direct MCO liability for negligent utilization review decisions,
physicians will continue to bear a disproportionate share of responsibility in a
healthcare delivery system that is increasingly beyond their control. Meanwhile,
patients will be harmed as MCOs continue to enjoy the benefits of control
untempered by the burdens of responsibility.96 By recognizing direct negligent
utilization review claims against MCOs, legislatures and courts can bring tort law
into harmony with the realities of our nation's managed care system.97 Describing
the propriety of direct MCO tort liability, one commentator has eloquently noted
that "an MCO has too many ways to influence the clinical decisions of medical
specialists to permit it to deny that it is in the business of practicing medicine or
otherwise to escape liability for breakdowns of the system over which it
presides."98
95 See Havighurst, supra note 16, at 611-21 (comparing and contrasting the legal structure
and framework of fee-for-service systems and managed care systems).
96 See Hirshfeld & Thomason, supra note 15, at 42.
97 See Henry, supra note 21, at 716-17 (discussing the positive aspects of direct MCO
liability); Hirshfeld & Thomason, supra note 15, at 39 (describing how economic pressures in
the managed care industry may result in narrowly construed definitions of "necessary care" and
a greater incentive to withhold treatments).
98 Havighurst, supra note 16, at 618.
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IV. ERISA PREEMPTION DOES NOT BAR CLAIMS AGAINST MANAGED
CARE ORGANIZATIONS FOR NEGLIGENT UTILIZATION REVIEW DECISIONS
A. ERISA Preemption in the Managed Care Industry
Direct liability for negligent utilization review decisions by MCOs serves
both the interests of the public and the interests of healthcare professionals. In
spite of the benefits of direct MCO liability, a number of obstacles prevent
plaintiffs from proceeding directly against MCOs. Strategically, medical
malpractice plaintiffs tend to overlook the role of MCOs and focus their cause of
action on the role of the physician or hospital. Moreover, plaintiffs may be
reluctant to seek recovery against an MCO if adequate compensation can be
obtained solely from the physician.
Perhaps the most onerous barrier to direct MCO liability involves ERISA's
preemption clause.99 Typically, MCOs rely on ERISA procedurally to remove
malpractice claims from state courts to federal courts and then use ERISA as a
shield to preempt the claims.100 Many federal circuit and district courts have
demonstrated a willingness to broadly construe ERISA preemption. Thus,
defendant-MCOs have a strategic advantage over plaintiffs in federal courts,
which are often more receptive to an ERISA preemption defense. This "remove
and preempf tactic has several unfortunate consequences. First, removal of state
medical malpractice claims to federal court under federal question jurisdiction
represents an inconvenience to plaintiffs and can be misused as a delaying tactic
by defendant-MCOs. Second, ERISA preemption allows MCOs to successfully
challenge malpractice claims on strictly procedural grounds. As a result, plaintiffs
are denied the opportunity to substantively confront MCOs regarding the
99 ERISA's preemption clause provides, in part, that "the provisions of this
subchapter... shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate
to any employee benefit plan ..... 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
100 See Franchise Tax Bd. of the State of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for
S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1983). The Franchise Tax Board Court stated:
Federal courts have regularly taken original jurisdiction... if the... suit would necessarily
present a federal question. Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA specifically grants trustees of
ERISA-covered plans... a cause of action for injunctive relief when their rights and duties
under ERISA are at issue, and that action is exclusively governed by federal law.
Id.; see also Pacificare of Olda., Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995) (seeking writ of
mandamus in order to argue federal question jurisdiction and preemption defense under
ERISA); Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995) (appealing defendant's removal to
federal court and preemption defense under ERISA); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of Kan.
City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993) (claiming both federal question jurisdiction and
preemption defense under ERISA); Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th
Cir. 1992) (claiming preemption defense under ERISA).
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consequences of their cost-containment decisions. Finally, by providing an escape
hatch from malpractice claims, ERISA preemption allows MCOs to unfairly
abandon their physicians who, as a result, are left to face the plaintiffs charges
alone. Because most courts have held that medical malpractice claims against
MCOs are preempted, many plaintiffs are unwilling to seek recovery against an
MCO in jurisdictions that extend ERISA preemption to defeat malpractice claims.
However, a closer analysis of recent preemption trends reveals that ERISA's
preemption clause does not bar malpractice claims against MCOs or any other
claims when the central issue is quality of care.
The doctrine of preemption holds that, under certain circumstances, state law
must give way to federal law.10 1 Preemption is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution,10 2 and the United States Supreme Court has
recognized the preemptive effect of federal law over state law since the early
nineteenth century. 103 A limited application of preemption preserves the
regulatory powers of the individual states. Conversely, an expansive application
of preemption allows for a comprehensive regulatory role on the part of the
federal government. A sweeping federal regulatory role in the ERISA context,
however, has denied managed care enrollees avenues of meaningful recovery for
adverse healthcare outcomes.
Preemption can be either express 104 or implied.105 Express preemption
occurs where a statute contains explicit language that addresses the relationship
between the federal law and the laws of the states. Express preemption analysis
101 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTITUTIoNAL LAW § 6-25, at 479 (2d ed.
1988).
102 The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution states as follows:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
10 3 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211 (1824) (describing the operation of the
Supremacy Clause in relation to state regulation as "[t]he appropriate application of... the
clause. . . is to such acts of the State Legislatures as do ... interfere with, or are contrary to the
laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the Constitution, or some treaty made under authority
of the United States. In every such case, the act of Congress ... is supreme; and the law of the
State... must yield to it.")..
104 See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (holding that Congress's
intent to preempt state law may be "explicitly stated in the statute's language...").
105 See TRIBE, supra note 101, § 6-25, at 479; see also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State
Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983); Fidelity Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. De ]a Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218,230 (1947).
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concentrates on the language of the statute in question in order to determine the
extent to which state law is preempted. Although ERISA contains an express
preemption clause, most courts have looked beyond the statutory language of the
clause in order to reach implied preemption considerations.
There are two varieties of implied preemption: conflict preemption and
occupation-of-the-field preemption. 10 6 Conflict preemption exists where a state
regulation directly contradicts an act of Congress107 or where the state law stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.'0 8 Courts have found incongruity between state and
federal regulations when state law has the effect of discouraging conduct that
congressional action seeks to encourage. 109 State regulations that encourage
certain conduct may be preempted if the banning of such conduct advances a
congressional purpose. 110 Also, courts may preempt a state regulation to facilitate
national, uniform regulatory standards.1 II Even if a state regulation is completely
in harmony with a federal scheme, the regulation may still be preempted if
Congress intends to occupy the field that is the subject of the regulation.112
Currently, ERISA preemption analysis in the majority of the courts is of the
occupation-of-the-field variety. Although the scope of occupation-of-the-field
preemption varies from subject to subject, 1 3 the basic principle is that state law is
void if it touches an area that Congress intends to completely monopolize via
federal regulation. 114 Thus, courts finding ERISA preemption of claims against
MCOs point to Congress's purported intent to wholly occupy the area of
10 6 See TRIBE, supra note 101, § 6-25, at 479.
107 See id § 6-26, at 481.
108 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67-68 (1941) ("Our primary function is to
determine whether, under the circumstances of this particular case, Pennsylvania's law stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.").
109 See TRIBE, supra note 101, § 6-26, at 482-84.
110 See i § 6-26, at 485-86.
111 See id. § 6-26, at 486-97.
112 See id. § 6-27, at 497-501.
113 See id § 6-27, at 497-98. Tribe explains:
The less comprehensive is a federal regulatory scheme, the more likely it is that a holding
ousting state jurisdiction would create a substantial legal vacuunm--and hence, the less
likely is such a holding.... Conversely, where a multiplicity of federal statutes or
regulations govem a field, the pervasiveness of such federal laws will help to sustain a
conclusion that Congress intended to exercise exclusive control over the subject matter.
Id.
114 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("[Tfhe Act of
Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system
will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.").
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employee benefit plan regulation as a bar to all state laws, including causes of
action brought under state law.
B. Preemption Analysis and Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
Prior to 1992, courts tended to bar state regulations and causes of action by a
broad application of the preemption doctrine.115 For example, in Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development
Commission, the United States Supreme Court found the Atomic Energy Act
preempted all state safety regulations of nuclear power plants.116 The Court
retreated somewhat from this position one year later in Silkwood v. Keer-McGee
Corp., holding that punitive damages were not preempted under the Atomic
Energy Act.117 However, in the area of employee benefit plans governed by
ERISA (such as MCOs), courts continued to hold that state medical malpractice
claims were preempted. 118 Such a broadly construed concept of preemption left
managed care enrollees, like Pappas, with little chance of recovery against MCOs
for poor healthcare outcomes.
The United States Supreme Court's decisions in Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc.'1 9 and in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Insurance Co.1 2 0 signal an end to unfettered preemption, both generally
and in the ERISA context, and offer hope for justice and accountability when
patients are harmed by MCO cost-containment decisions. The issue that the
115 See Kurt B. Chadwell, Automobile Passive Restraint Claims Post-Cipollone: An End
to the Federal Preemption Defense, 46 BAYLoR L. REv. 141, 153-65 (1994) (discussing
preemption and airbag cases prior to 1992); Rudy Fabian, Comment, Federal Preemption: Car-
Makers' Cushion Against Air Bag Claims?, 27 DuQ. L. REv. 299 (1989) (discussing the
doctrine of preemption and its relation to automobile safety claims as they were understood in
the late 1980s).
116 See461 U.S. 190, 191 (1983).
117 See 464 U.S. 238,238 (1984).
118 See Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996); Tolton v.
American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 1995); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of
Kan. City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993); Corcoran v. United Health Care, Inc. 965 F.2d
1321 (5th Cir. 1992); Butler v. Wu, 853 F. Supp. 125 (D.NJ. 1994); Visconti v. U.S. Health
Care, 857 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1993).
But see Pacificare of Oda., Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995); Rice v. Panchal, 65
F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995); Edelen v. Osterman, 943 F. Supp. 75 (D.D.C. 1996); Ouellette v.
Christ Hosp., 942 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Ohio 1996); Roessert v. Health Net, 929 F. Supp. 343
(N.D. Cal. 1996); Chaghervand v. Carefirst, 909 F. Supp. 304 (D. Md. 1995); Jackson v.
Roseman, 878 F. Supp. 820 (D. Md. 1995); Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 544
(S.D. fI1. 1994); Dearmas v. Av-Med, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Keamey v. U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Smith v. HMO Great Lakes, 852 F. Supp.
669 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
119 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
120 514 US. 645 (1995).
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United States Supreme Court sought to resolve in Cipollone was whether the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempted Cipollone's common
law claims against the cigarette manufacturers.121 In reaching its decision, the
Court prescribed the proper manner in which to approach preemption issues when
the statute contains an express preemption provision-as is the case with
ERISA.122 First, the Court acknowledged the presumption against preemption.1 23
Citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., the Court wrote, "[c]onsideration of
issues arising under the Supremacy Clause 'start[s] with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by... Federal Act
[sic] unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."' 124 Next, the
Court focused on the preemption provision of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act.125 Congress explicitly addressed the preemption issue in the
Act; thus, the Court saw no reason to infer implied preemption 126 or to extend its
analysis beyond an interpretation of the provision itself.127 This left only the
question of express preemption to be resolved through principles of statutory
interpretation.128 The Court described its analysis as a fair, but narrow,
121 See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 508.
12 2 See id at 524-30 (finding partial preemption of Cipollone's failure to warn claim, no
preemption of the breach of express warranty claim, preemption of only one of the two theories
of the fraudulent misrepresentation claim, no preemption of another theory of fraudulent
misrepresentation, and no preemption of the conspiracy claim).
123 See id at 516 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) and
Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497,504 (1978)).
124 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)).
125 See id at 517 (quoting California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272,
282 (1987) and Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497,505 (1978)). The Cipollone Court
explained:
When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has included in the enacted
legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when that provision provides a
"reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority"... "there is no
need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions"
of the legislation.
Id. (citations omitted). See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1994) (preempting state law under the
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act).
126 See id. ("[W]e need only identify the domain expressly pre-empted....
127 See id ("Such reasoning is a variant of the familiar principle of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius: Congress' enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute
implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted.").
128 See Lars Noah, Reconceptualiing Federal Preemption of Tort Claims as the
Government Standards Defense, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 903, 914 (1996) ("[T]he Supreme
Court in Cipollone viewed its task as limited to interpreting the scope of the statutory language
...-'V).
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construction of the precise language of the preemption provision in light of the
strong presumption against preemption.129 In defining the preemptive scope of
such express preemption provisions, the Court noted that "each phrase within that
clause limits the universe of common-law claims pre-empted by the statute."1 30
The Court's analysis of preemption in Cipollone was a welcomed departure
from the way courts previously approached the issue.131 Past decisions focused
on the purpose and intent of federal regulations to find preemption of state
common law actions.132 Other courts emphasized the desirability of a uniform,
national scheme as grounds to bar state common law claims.133 Still, other courts
found preemption by equating state common law tort judgment with state
regulations. 134 Although the Cipollone Court acknowledged that damage awards
can operate to govern conduct as effectively as legislative enactments, the Court
concluded that such awards were not necessarily preempted.135 In Cipollone, the
Court precluded a finding of implied preemption and abandoned uniformity,
intent, and defacto regulatory concerns in favor of strict statutory interpretation
when the statute in question contains an express preemption provision. 136
12 9 See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 523.
130 Id. at 524.
131 See Chadwell, supra note 115, at 168 (discussing the Court's critique of and departure
from the reasoning of the Third Circuit); Susan J. Stabile, Preemption of State Law by Federal
Law: A Task for Congress or the Courts?, 40 VILL. L. REv. 1, 60 (1995) ("In Cipollone, the
Supreme Court resolved the conflict that existed in the lower courts, effectively rejecting the
approach taken, not only by a number of lower courts in analyzing the ... Cigarette Act, but
also by courts interpreting the preemptive reach of other federal statutes with express
preemption provisions.").
132 See Chadwell, supra note 115, at 158-59 (discussing judicial interpretation of
congressional intent regarding federal occupation of the field of automobile safety).
133 See Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 419 (1st Cir. 1988) (preempting a
product liability claim and stating "if Congress intended.., to create [a] dual system of
regulation, plaintiff fails to explain why Congress forbade state agencies from setting standards
nonidentical to the federal standards ... ").
134 See Timothy Wilton, Federalism Issues in "No Airbag" Tort Claims: Preemption and
Reciprocal Comity, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 17-19 (1986) (discussing the potential for state
safety standards to be enforced through a variety of methods, including jury verdicts in
common law actions).
135 See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521 (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236,247 (1959)).
136 See Chadwell, supra note 115, at 168 ("ITlhe Court defined its task in narrow terms,
stating that it 'need only identify the domain expressly preempted by each' of the respective
preemption sections .... "); Stabile, supra note 131, at 60 ('The Court noted that there is no
need to examine further the substantive provisions of the legislation to infer congressional intent
to preempt state law when Congress has included in the legislation a provision explicitly
addressing preemption. . ?').
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C. Preemption and ERISA in the Post-Cipollone Era
The evolution of preemption jurisprudence, which culminated in the
Cipollone decision, unfortunately has not been entirely reflected in the area of
ERISA preemption. In other contexts, most notably automobile safety and
tobacco regulation, preemption has been limited in scope by a narrow
interpretation of the express preemptive language where the relevant statute
contains a preemption clause.' 37 In ERISA preemption cases, the majority of
courts continue to read the limiting language of ERISA's preemption
provision,138 in conjunction with the savings clause, 139 the deemer clause,140 and
the civil enforcement provision,141 in an overly expansive manner or ignore the
language entirely in order to find virtually limitless implied preemption. These
courts extend ERISA's preemptive scope far beyond what the statute mandates
and disregard the Cipollone Court's guidance concerning proper preemption
analysis. As a result, the majority of federal circuit courts have given MCOs a
refuge from accountability and liability for their cost-containment decisions and
have denied plaintiffs the opportunity to seek redress from truly culpable parties
when they are injured by those decisions.
Passed in 1974, ERISA was intended to safeguard the financial solvency of
employee pension plans. 142 Almost as an afterthought, healthcare plans, and later
137 See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (construing the
preemption clause of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act); Wilson v. Pleasant,
660 N.E.2d 327 (nd. 1995) (construing the preemption clause of the Federal National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act).
138 See supra note 99.
139 ERISA's savings clause provides that "[e]xcept as provided in subparagraph (B),
nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of
any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." 29 U.S.C. § 1 144(b)(2)(A) (1994).
140 ERISA's deemer clause provides that:
Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title, which is not
exempt under section 1003(b) of this title... nor any trust established under such a plan,
shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or
investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for the
purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance
contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1994).
141 ERISA's civil enforcement provision provides that "[a] civil action may be brought by
a participant or beneficiary to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce
his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of
the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 132(a)(1)(B) (1994).
142 See Pittman, supra note 22, at 358-59. Pittman states that:
In enacting ERISA, Congress' primary purpose was to protect employees from
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managed care plans provided via employment compensation, were incorporated
into ERISA's regulatory scheme 143 The United States Supreme Court addressed
the preemptive reach of ERISA in 1983 in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.144
Concentrating on the "relate to" language of ERISA's preemption provision, the
Shaw Court found that ERISA preempted New York's Human Rights Law, a
comprehensive anti-discrimination statute, and Disability Benefits Law, a statute
mandating certain employee benefits. 145 In so holding, the Court found that "[a]
law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it
has a connection with or reference to such a plan."'14 6 Despite this exceedingly
broad definition of the "relate to" language and the expansive concept of ERISA
preemption, the Shaw Court did concede that "[s]ome state actions may affect
employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant
a finding that the law 'relates to' the plan."147
The Shaw concept of ERISA preemption, with its illimitable construction of
the "relate to" language, was reaffirmed by a unanimous Court in Pilot Life
Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux.148 In addition to finding preemption of Dedeaux's
common law causes of action against his health insurer for tortious breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duties, and fraud, 149 the Court went further in finding
that:
Congress clearly expressed an intent that the civil enforcement provisions of
ERISA... be the exclusive vehicle for actions by ERISA-plan participants and
beneficiaries... and that varying state causes of action for claims within the
scope of [the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA] would pose an obstacle to
administrative and funding abuses while establishing fair vesting requirements for
pensions .... At the time of its enactment ERISA was heralded as "nothing less than a
pension 'bill of rights' to which every worker-regardless of his [or her] occupation,
salary, or status-is entitled."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
14 3 See id. at 360 ('There is no indication in the language of ERISA's preemption clause,
or in ERISA's legislative history, that employers and benefit plans were to obtain some self-
promoting protection from state law regulations."). ERISA defines "employee welfare benefit
plan" and "welfare plan," in part, as "any plan, fund, or program. . . established or maintained
by an employer.., for the purpose of providing for its participants or their
beneficiaries,... medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of
sickness, accident, disability, [or] death ..... 29 U.S.C. § 1002(l)(A) (1994).
144 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
145 See id at 96.
146 See id at 96-97.
14 7 Id. at 100n.21.
148 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
14 9 See id at 47.
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the purposes and objectives of Congress. 150
In the wake of Shaw and Pilot Life, virtually any claim that mentioned an ERISA-
covered health plan was deemed to "relate to" the plan and was, thus, preempted
by the overly-expansive concept of ERISA preemption. Additionally, claims
against health plans and MCOs were confined to ERISA's inadequate civil
enforcement provision. Plaintiffs were left without an adequate means in which to
seek recovery against MCOs, and individual states were unable to regulate and
safeguard the quality of healthcare provided by MCOs.
Three years after Pilot Life, the Court reaffirmed Shaw's broad definition of
"relate to" and its advocacy of a sweeping scope of ERISA preemption in
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon.151 However, the Ingersoll-Rand Court did
show a willingness to entertain the notion that some state laws were beyond
ERISA's preemptive grasp. 152 Thus, the Ingersoll-Rand decision began the end
of unchecked ERISA preemption by recognizing limits to ERISA's preemption
clause. The stage was set for the Court's decision in New York State Conference
ofBlue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.153
D. Resolving the Competing Views ofERISA Preemption
At the time the Court decided Travelers, the federal circuits were divided,
and continue to be divided, over the appropriate scope of ERISA preemption. The
majority of circuits advocate an expansive view of ERISA's "relate to" language
or look to extra-textual sources in order to preempt state causes of action against
MCOs. 154 For example, in Kuhl v. Lincoln National Health Plan of Kansas City,
150 Id. at52.
151 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990) ("A law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal
sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.") (citing Shaw v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983)).
152 See ic The Ingersoll-Rand Court stated:
Notwithstanding its breadth, we have recognized limits to ERISA's pre-emption clause. In
Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., the Court held that ERISA did not
pre-empt a State's general garnishment statute, even though it was applied to collect
judgments against plan participants. The fact that collection might burden the
administration of a plan did not, by itself, compel pre-emption. Moreover, under the plain
language of [ERISA's preemption clause] the Court has held that only state laws that relate
to benefit plans are pre-empted. Thus, even though a state law required payment of
severance benefits, which would normally fall within the purview of ERISA, it was not
pre-empted because the statute did not require the establishment or maintenance of an
ongoing plan.
Id. (citations omitted).
153 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
154 See, e.g., Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996);
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Inc., the Eight Circuit opted against strict statutory interpretation and
characterized the resolution of ERISA preemption issues as a "question of
legislative intent.1155 The Kuhl court found "no doubt" of Congress's intent that
"the preemption clause ... be construed extremely broadly."'156 Even courts that
limited their analysis to the text of ERISA found a wide reach of preemption. In
Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., the Sixth Circuit seized upon ERISA's "relate
to" phrase as the beginning and end of ERISA preemption analysis.' 57 Even
though the Tolton court acknowledged that their concept of ERISA preemption
limited plaintiffs in MCO liability cases to recovery under ERISA's civil
enforcement provision and left them "without a meaningful remedy,"' 5 8 the court
found that because Tolton's cause of action arose "from [the MCO's] refusal to
authorize.., benefits.., under the plan," Tolton's claim "related to" an ERISA
plan and was, thus, preempted. 159 These majority jurisdictions stretch the
meaning of "relate to" to its farthest possible reaches and rely on a purported
Congressional intent to keep all ERISA issues strictly within the realm of federal
regulation. As a result, these circuits construe ERISA to provide a shield for
defendant-MCOs that defeats any claims brought under state law for injuries
arising out of utilization review and cost-containment decisions.
In a minority of circuits, however, state causes of action against MCOs
survive based on a much narrower reading of the ERISA preemption
provision.160 The Tenth Circuit in Airparts Co. v. Custom Benefit Services of
Austin, Inc., delineated four distinct types of laws that fall within the ambit of the
"relate to" language of ERISA's preemption clause. 161 The laws that "relate to"
ERISA plans, in the view of the Airparts court, all involve regulation of the
structure, terms, benefits, or administration of employee benefit plans. Thus,
according to the Airparts court, laws that do not directly touch upon these areas
do not "relate to" the plan and are not preempted. The court further noted that
laws of "general applicability... that involve traditional areas of state
Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 942-43 (6th Cir. 1995); Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 1994); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of Kan. City, Inc., 999
F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993); Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 13 F.3d 310 (9th Cir. 1993); Corcoran v.
United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
155 999 F.2d at 301.
156 Id.
157 See 48 F.3d at 942-43.
15 8 Id. at 943.
159 See id. at 942.
160 See, e.g., Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995); Pacificare of
Okla., Inc. v. Burage, 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995); Airparts Co. v. Custom Benefit Serv. of
Austin, Inc., 28 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1994); United Wire, Metal & Mach. Health & Welfare
Fund v. Morristown Mem'l Hosp., 995 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir. 1993); Painters of Phila. Dist.
Council No. 21 Welfare Fund v. Price Waterhouse, 879 F.2d 1146 (3d Cir. 1989).
161 See.Airparts Co., 28 F.3d at 1064-65.
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regulation," such as medical malpractice and healthcare quality, do not "relate to"
ERISA plans and suffer no preemption. 162 The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed this
analysis in Pacificare of Oklahona, Inc. v. Burrage and added that malpractice
claims are "too tenuous, remote, or peripheral" to ERISA's regulatory scheme to
trigger preemption.163 Courts endorsing a more limited scope of ERISA
preemption strike an equitable balance between the federal government's
legitimate need for national, uniform regulation of employee benefit plans with
the state's interest in safeguarding the quality of the healthcare delivery system for
its citizens.164 Thus, plaintiffs in minority jurisdictions can reasonably recover
against MCOs for poor healthcare quality arising out of cost-containment
considerations without upsetting the legitimate aim of ERISA's regulatory
scheme.
Both the majority and minority positions discussed above are supported by
compelling authority and reasonable, albeit competing, interpretations of the
"relate to" phrase of ERISA's preemption provision. However, the majority of
circuits that have examined the issue of ERISA preemption ignore the lessons of
the United States Supreme Court. Circuits that preempt claims against MCOs
have reached the wrong conclusion as a result of their failure to follow the
preemption analysis outlined in Cipollone and further refined in Travelers.
The Travelers Court, like the Cipollone Court, began its analysis by
acknowledging the long-standing presumption against preemption. 165 The Court
next looked to the "relate to" language of the ERISA preemption clause. The
Court concluded that if the "relate to" phrase was taken to its "furthest stretch of
indeterminacy," ERISA preemption "would never run its course." 166 The Court
then turned to the Shaw167 definition of "relate to," yet rejected its "connection
with" language as unhelpful and vague.1 68
Finding the language of ERISA's preemption provision ambiguous, the Court
turned to the legislative intent of ERISA to define its preemptive scope. 169 In
162 See id. at 1065 (quoting National Elevator Ind., Inc. v. Calhoon, 957 F.2d 1555, 1559
(10th Cir. 1992)).
163 See Paeificare of Olda., Inc., 59 F.3d at 154 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463
U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983)).
164 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (acknowledging that the regulation
of health and safety is traditionally a state matter consistent with the historic police powers of
the states to protect their citizens).
165 See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995) ("[W]e have never assumed lightly that Congress has derogated
state regulation, but instead have addressed claims of pre-emption with the starting presumption
that Congress does not intend to supplant state law.").
166 Id. at 655.
167 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
168 See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656.
169 See iL at 656-57. The Court explained the objective of the ERISA preemption clause:
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holding that the New York statute at issue, which imposed surcharges on ERISA
plans, was not barred by preemption, the Travelers Court held that:
[N]othing in the language of [ERISA] or the context of its passage indicates that
Congress chose to displace general health care regulation, which historically has
been a matter of local concern .... [Laws with only an indirect economic effect
on... health insurance packages in a given State are a far cry from those
"conflicting directives" from which Congress meant to insulate ERISA
plans .... We therefore conclude that such state laws do not bear the requisite
"connection with" ERISA plans to trigger pre-emption. 170
Although the Travelers decision concerned state surcharges on health plans,
the Court's analysis is instructive on the proper relationship between negligence
claims against MCOs and ERISA preemption. First, the Travelers Court was
quite clear on the point that state causes of action that indirectly affect the
administration of ERISA plans or that are generally applicable will survive
ERISA preemption. 171 Negligent utilization review claims do not address the
[as] described in the House of Representatives by a sponsor of the Act, Representative
Dent,... to "eliminat[e] the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State and local
regulation." Senator Williams made the same point, that "with the narrow exceptions
specified in the bill, the substantive and enforcement provisions ... are intended to
preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or
inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans." The basic thrust of the
pre-emption clause, then, was to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the
nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans.
Id. (citations omitted).
170 Id. at 661-62 (emphasis added).
171 See id The Court explained that:
Indeed, to read the pre-emption provision as displacing all state laws affecting costs and
charges on the theory that they indirectly relate to ERISA plans that purchase insurance
policies or HMO memberships that would cover such services, would effectively read the
limiting language in § 514(a) out of the statute, a conclusion that would violate basic
principles of statutory interpretation and could not be squared with our prior
pronouncement that "[p]reemption does not occur... if the state law has only a tenuous,
remote, or peripheral connection with covered plans, as is the case with many laws of
general applicability." While Congress's extension of pre-emption to all "state laws
relating to benefit plans" was meant to sweep more broadly than "state laws dealing with
the subject matters covered by ERISA[,] reporting, disclosure, fiduciary responsibility, and
the like," nothing in the language of the Act or the context of its passage indicates that
Congress chose to displace general health care regulation, which historically has been a
matter of local concern ....
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted); see also Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency &
Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 833 (1988) (noting that ERISA plans may be sued for "run-of-the-
mill-state-law claims such as ... torts committed by an ERISA plan...).
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organizational or administrative aspects of managed care plans governed by
ERISA. Rather, such claims address the quality of care delivered by MCOs and
seek relief for plaintiffs, like Pappas, who are harmed as a result of plan policies
or decisions. Thus, any impact that a negligent utilization review claim may have
on an ERISA plan is decidedly indirect. Second, negligent utilization review
claims against managed care entities impact both ERISA-covered and non-
ERISA-covered managed care systems. Therefore, such causes of action are
generally applicable and outside the scope of ERISA preemption as understood
by the Travelers Court. Third, echoes of Cipollone's endorsement of a fair, but
narrow, construction of the precise language of preemption provisions in light of
the strong presumption against preemption are found in the Travelers decision. 172
To read ERISA's "relate to" phrase expansively to preempt negligent utilization
review claims against MCOs is contrary to the fair and narrow construction of
preemptive language advocated by the Court in Travelers and Cipollone.
Moreover, such unduly broad preemption of negligent utilization review claims
runs contrary to the state's interests in safeguarding healthcare quality and
important federalist concerns that the Court implicated in its acknowledgment of
the presumption against preemption. Fourth, the Cipollone Court clearly directs
preemption analysis away from extra-textual concerns and supports the
predominance of strict textual interpretation when the statute in question contains
an express preemption provision.173 Although the Travelers decision considered
the legislative intent of ERISA after finding ambiguity in the text of the
preemption clause, the Court's analysis is consistent with an emphasis on
textualism and a strong reluctance to find boundless preemption based upon a
slippery and ill-defined, extra-textual inquiry. Clearly, when ERISA preemption
is analyzed against the background of Cipollone and Travelers, negligent
utilization review claims against MCOs do not "relate to" ERISA plans within the
meaning of the preemption provision and, thus, are not preempted.
When the evolution of ERISA preemption is considered in conjunction with
the evolution of preemption generally, ERISA preemption no longer presents an
obstacle to negligent utilization review claims against MCOs. As one circuit
wrote, "laws of general application-not specifically targeting ERISA plans-
that involve traditional areas of state regulation and do not affect 'relations among
the principle ERISA entities-the employer, the plan, the plan fiduciaries, and the
beneficiaries'-often are found not to 'relate to' an ERISA plan. ' 174 To allow
MCOs to continue to use ERISA preemption as a refuge from liability overlooks
the shrinking scope of preemption and ignores the Court's guidance on what it
means to "relate to" an ERISA plan. As Pittman points out, negligent utilization
172 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 523 (1992).
173 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
174 Airparts Co. v. Custom Benefit Serv. of Austin, Inc., 28 F.3d 1062, 1065 (10th Cir.
1994) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Neusser, 810 F.2d 550, 555-56 (6th Cir. 1987)).
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review claims against MCOs should not be included in ERISA's preemptive
reach because such claims (1) are traditionally a state, and not a federal, concern,
(2) are generally applicable and only reach ERISA plans incidentally, and (3) do
not affect relations between major ERISA participants. 175
V. PROPOSED TORT LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT UTILIZATION
REVIEW DECISIONS
A. The Cause ofAction
The implementation of MCO tort liability for utilization review decisions
should be modeled on the tort of negligence or medical malpractice.176 Such a
fianework comports with traditional notions of negligence as stated in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. The Restatement recognizes that one's interest in
physical integrity and well-being is an interest "protected against ... invasion."' 177
This protected interest gives rise to a duty on the part of MCOs to refrain from
invading that interest. Such duty stems from the fact that utilization review
decisions implicate the protected interest by placing a patient's health and
physical well-being at risk. Therefore, MCOs are under a duty to conduct
utilization review determinations in a non-negligent manner.
Restatement section 291 analyzes the unreasonableness of an action, and
hence its negligence, based upon a balancing of the risk of harm to another
against the utility of the act and the manner in which the act is performed.178 In
the utilization review context the risk of harm involves the consequences flowing
from denial or delay of treatment and may include serious injury or death. The
utility aspect of utilization review decisions includes financial savings and the
elimination of unnecessary treatment and expenses. Under the Restatement
position, the magnitude of the risk of delayed or denied treatment is so great that a
utilization review determination that places cost containment over quality of care
is unreasonable, and therefore, negligent.179
Courts have defined negligence in the medical malpractice context as
"unskillful practice resulting in injury to the patient, [caused by] a failure to
exercise the 'required degree of care, skill and diligence' under the
circumstances." 180 States that have imposed or attempted to impose MCO
175 See Pittman, supra note 22, at 412-13 (discussing principles that exclude MCO tort
liability from ERISA preemption).
176 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965) (stating the elements
of a cause of action for negligence).
177 Id. § 281(a).
178 See id § 291.
179 See id.
180 FORROW, supra note 10, § 6-2, at 237 (citing Wainwright v. Leary, 623 So2d 233,237
(La. Ct. App. 1993), writ denied, 629 Sol2d 1127 (La. 1993)).
1454 [Vol. 59:1423
MANAGED CARE ACCOUNTABILITY
liability statutorily have framed the issue of negligence in terms of a failure to
exercise "ordinary care." 181 This "ordinary care" standard is analogous to the
"degree of care, skill and diligence" standard for medical malpractice cases.
Ordinary care for utilization review decisions has been defined as the "degree of
care that a person of ordinary prudence in the same profession, specialty, or area
of practice ... would use in the same or similar circumstances." 182 Under this
standard, utilization review decisions that result in harm to patients would fall
outside the purview of "ordinary care" and would give rise to an action for
negligence. Conversely, utilization review determinations that reduce costs
without negatively impacting patient outcomes would be within the scope of
"ordinary care" and would not be actionable in tort.
Thus, under this proposed form of negligence for MCO utilization review
decisions, an MCO is under a duty to make utilization review determinations in a
"reasonable" manner and exercise "ordinary care." Where a utilization review
determination results in harm to a patient, the analysis shifts to a twofold inquiry.
The first issue is whether cost-containment considerations were given priority
over healthcare quality and the patient's best interests. The second question is
whether the denied or delayed treatment was the legal cause of the adverse
outcome. Where these are the case, the utilization review decision is unreasonable
and negligent in accordance with the Restatement position and actionable under a
negligence theory.
B. Proving the Cause ofAction
In medical malpractice cases, the standard of customary practice is
established through the expert witness testimony of physicians. 183 Similarly, the
"ordinary care" standard for utilization review decisions would be established by
utilization review experts from within the managed care industry. In setting the
standard, MCOs would be compelled to formulate criteria that account for both
patient safety as well as financial considerations. Although such a scheme
necessarily permits MCOs to set their own standards, this is unavoidable. As with
medical malpractice standards, an uninformed evaluation of both the complexities
of medically appropriate treatment and the economic constraints of managed care
is insufficient to set a suitable standard of care for utilization review decisions.184
Therefore, plaintiffs in negligent utilization review actions would be required to
establish breach of the standard of care through the use of utilization review
experts. In particularly egregious cases of denied or delayed treatment, however, a
181 See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(a) (West Supp. 1998); H.R. 677,
122d General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1998).
182 Ohio H.R. 677.
183 See FURROW, supra note 10, § 6-2, at 241.
184 See KEETON, supra note 58, § 32, at 189 (describing the rationale for permitting the
medical profession to set its own legal standards of conduct).
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plaintiff could establish negligent utilization review predicated upon a common
knowledge or negligence per se basis.185
C. Applying the Cause ofAction
Pappas86 provides an illustrative fact pattern for the proposed tort of
negligent utilization review. Under this tort theory, Pappas would have a legally
cognizable cause of action directly against the HMO. Additionally, with the
removal of ERISA preemption, Pappas would have an opportunity to contest the
propriety of his HMO's actions based on the substantive merits of the case. This
cause of action would exist independent and separate from any liability involving
the hospital or the physicians. Pappas would allege that (1) United States
Healthcare, Inc. (USHC) had a duty to make their utilization review
determination in a reasonable and non-negligent manner, (2) by denying and
delaying appropriate treatment for the sake of cost containment, USHC breached
its duty by making a negligent utilization review decision that failed to comport
with the standard of "ordinary care," (3) the delayed treatment flowing from the
negligent utilization review decision was the legal cause of Pappas's injuries, and
(4) Pappas sustained compensable injuries as evidenced by his quadriplegia.
In proving and defending this cause of action, both the plaintiff and the
defendant would primarily rely on the expert testimony of utilization review
experts. This reliance on expert witnesses is analogous to the pivotal role played
by experts in medical malpractice actions. The expert status of a utilization review
witness would be predicated upon the witness's knowledge, skill, and training in
both the clinical and fiscal aspects of managed care. An ideal utilization review
expert would wear two hats: that of a physician and that of a healthcare
economist. Such specialized knowledge would enable these expert witnesses to
testify as to the appropriateness of a given utilization review decision in light of
the competing clinical and financial considerations.
Assuming that the cause of action was not resolved before trial, Pappas's
expert would testify that USHC's utilization review decision was negligent. In
light of the surrounding circumstances, the need for prompt, specialized medical
attention outweighed the cost savings achieved by the denial and delay of
Pappas's treatment. In other words, it was unreasonable, and therefore negligent,
for USHC to delay and deny the necessary and appropriate care. Conversely,
USHC's expert would testify that, at the time the utilization review decision was
rendered, it was reasonable to opt for cost savings over the physician's
recommendations. Given the specific facts of Pappas, such testimony on the part
of the defense would stretch credulity. However, in a closer case, the issue of the
185 See FURROW, supra note 10, § 6-2, at 243-44 (describing various methods of proving
a medical malpractice claim).
186 Pappas v. Asbel, 675 A.2d 711 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
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negligence and appropriateness of a utilization review decision would likely be an
open question ideally suited for resolution by the trier of fact.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the progress and innovations brought about by managed care, cost-
containment policies continue to jeopardize the health of managed care enrollees
and undermine the autonomy and clinical judgment of physicians. The current
state of managed care liability has proven inadequate to correct these deficiencies.
It is clear that liability for negligent utilization review decisions can bring about a
much needed change in utilization review policies. With the erosion of
preemption, courts should refrain from extending ERISA protection to MCOs
against direct tort liability. By stripping away the ERISA shield, courts can clear
the way for liability for negligent utilization review decisions. Tort liability would
contribute to utilization review determinations by forcing MCOs to internalize the
costs resulting from negligent decisions. The internalization of these costs would,
in turn, motivate MCOs to opt for reasonable quality over unreasonable cost
containment.
1998] 1457

